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GLD-002        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3346 
___________ 
 
NICHOLAS J. QUEEN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONALD ROMINE, Warden 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-98-cv-02074) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 4, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  November 16, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
Nicholas J. Queen, a federal prisoner, appeals the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for relief brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  We will summarily affirm.  
See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
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In 1994, Queen was sentenced to 562 months’ incarceration for his involvement in 
a series of bank robberies and related offenses.  In 1998, Queen challenged the execution 
of his sentence by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  In 2000, the 
District Court denied his petition.  Since then, Queen has repeatedly sought relief from 
this Court and the District Court to no avail.  As we write for the benefit of the parties 
alone, we need not repeat that history here. See Queen v. Dodrill, C.A. No. 04-1212, slip. 
op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2004); Queen v. Romine, C.A. No. 05-4564, slip. op. at 2 (3d 
Cir. Nov. 17, 2005).  Most recently, Queen filed a Rule 60(b) motion on January 30, 
2012, alleging that federal prison officials have failed to properly credit the time served 
toward his federal sentence and, therefore, have violated the Privacy Act.  The District 
Court denied his motion by order entered August 1, 2012.  Queen timely appealed.1
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Generally, we 
review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion, but we 
review de novo whether Queen’s motion is more appropriately considered a second or 
successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
   
Pridgen v. Shannon
To the extent Queen reasserts his claim that his federal sentence has not been 
properly credited or recorded, we reiterate that Queen has been given full credit toward 
his federal sentence. 
, 
380 F.3d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Queen v. Romine
                                              
1 On August 24, 2012, this Court advised the parties that this matter would be considered 
for possible summary action and granted the parties twenty-one days to submit written 
argument.  Queen timely responded, requesting a full review of his case. 
, C.A. No. 02-2872, slip. op. at  2 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 
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2002).  No relief is due.2  Moreover, though Queen brings his motion for relief under 
Rule 60(b), as he has presented this claim numerous times before, it is more appropriately 
considered an unauthorized second or successive motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 526 (2005); Pridgen
Queen also appears to claim that records pertaining to his federal custody have not 
been properly maintained, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(5) 
(requiring agencies to maintain accurate records), (g)(1)(C) (authorizing civil action 
against agency for failure to properly maintain records).  Queen offers no evidentiary 
support for this claim.  Further, Queen’s reliance on 
, 380 F.3d at 727.  Therefore, the 
District Court properly denied Queen’s Rule 60(b) motion. 
Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 
F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992), is misplaced.  In Sellers, the circuit court examined the 
circumstances under which the courts will recognize a civil action resulting in an award 
of money damages. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court 
 at 312.  It is not relevant in the context of a habeas petition. 
                                              
2 Queen makes an oblique reference to Lono v. Fenton, 581 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1978).  
Lono interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 5003 to condition transfer of a state prisoner to a federal 
prison upon a showing that the federal system would provide specialized treatment 
unavailable in the state system.  It is no longer good law in the Seventh Circuit and was 
never found persuasive by this Court.  Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480 (1981) 
(“[N]othing in [§ 5003(a)] can be fairly read as requiring that some kind of ‘treatment’ 
must be furnished to every state prisoner transferred to a federal facility.”); Beshaw v. 
Fenton, 635 F.2d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting Lono). 
